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Abstract 
 
This paper examines how firms respond to proposed regulation. Specifically, we utilize the time 
period over which banking authorities discussed, adopted, and implemented Basel III to examine 
how banks responded to the proposed regulatory framework. We find that banks were not only 
quick to lobby rule makers against the proposal, but that they also simultaneously altered their 
business models and made strategic financial reporting changes in response to it. We also 
provide evidence that banks were more likely to make these anticipatory changes when they: 1) 
benefitted more from signaling an early commitment, or 2) had less uncertainty about whether 
they would be subjected to the regulation. Taken together, our findings indicate that firms’ 
incentives lead them to simultaneously respond through multiple channels when faced with 
regulatory uncertainty.   
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1. Introduction 
Prior research shows that firms immediately respond to potential regulation by lobbying 
rule makers in an attempt to alter the terms of the regulation toward the firm’s own economic 
interests (Zimmerman and Watts 1978, Deakin 1989). However, little is known about whether  
firms take actions to implement these proposed regulatory changes or whether they wait until the 
regulation is implemented. In this paper, we utilize the time period over which rule makers 
discussed, adopted, and implemented the Third Basel Accord (“Basel III) to examine if, when, 
and through which channels U.S. banks responded to the proposed regulation. Our primary 
finding is that the banks targeted by the proposal were not only quick to lobby rule makers 
against it, but that they simultaneously altered their business models and made strategic financial 
reporting changes to comply with it. We also provide evidence that banks were more likely to 
make these anticipatory changes if they: 1) benefitted more from signaling an early commitment, 
or 2) had less uncertainty about whether they would be subjected to the regulation.  
An inherent challenge of studying how firms respond to proposed regulation is 
identifying a setting where the proposed regulation is clearly stated, has the potential to 
materially impact firms’ operations, and allows researchers to observe the channels through 
which firms may respond.  The initial Basel III consultative document, released in December 
2009, included a provision that targeted bank reliance on the originate-to-distribute (“OTD”) 
lending model. This lending model was not only a significant contributor to the onset of the 
recent financial crisis (Acharya and Richardson 2009; Crotty 2009; Allen and Carletti 2010), it is 
also central to many banks’ operations.  The MSR provision included in Basel III called for an 
increase in the risk-weighting of mortgage-servicing rights (“MSRs”) to 250% from their 
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previous 100% risk-weighting and to cap a bank’s MSRs at 10% of its Tier 1 capital. These 
proposed changes threatened to increase the regulatory costs associated with holding MSRs by 
approximately 63% before taking the 10% limitation into consideration (Mortgage Bankers 
Association 2012). Assuming that the 10% limitation was breached, the increase in regulatory 
costs would be considerably higher than 63%. We utilize this 10% bright-line threshold to 
capture the differential costs and incentives faced by banks above and below the threshold. 
Upon release of the consultative document, banks had the option to wait until the 
regulatory process was complete to ensure that they would not incur costs complying with an 
uncertain standard that was not yet effective. However, in exercising that option, these banks 
were also foregoing several benefits associated with early adoption. These benefits included: 
having additional time to make the required changes, spreading the transition costs over an 
extended period of time, and sending a valuable signal to regulators and investors that the firm is 
compliant with a more stringent set of standards (Akerlof 1970, Bernanke 1983, Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994).  
On the other hand, banks could obtain these benefits by taking immediate actions to 
respond to the proposed regulatory terms but incur the risk of adopting a rule that may continue 
to change. In our setting, banks could do this through three primary channels: (1) slow the 
creation of new MSRs by reducing their use of the OTD lending model, (2) reduce the amount of 
existing MSRs by selling a portion of their mortgage servicing portfolio, or (3) decrease the 
valuation of their MSRs by using the discretion afforded to them under fair value accounting 
rules (Altamuro and Zhang 2013). The fact that each of these three channels is costly to firms, 
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and observable to researchers, makes Basel III a powerful setting to conduct a comprehensive 
examination of our research question.1 
We begin our empirical analysis by examining whether banks above the 10% threshold 
were more likely than other banks to lobby against the MSR provision. Because prior research 
documents that a firm’s lobbying efforts are strategically aligned with its own incentives, this 
analysis is also useful in validating our identification strategy. That is, if the banks above the 
10% threshold feel more regulatory pressure from the MSR provision then we would expect 
them to be more likely to lobby against the provision relative to other banks. Consistent with this 
expectation, we examine more than 2,800 comment letters received by the Basel Committee and 
the Federal Reserve during the rule-making process. We find that, relative to other banks, banks 
above the 10% threshold were more likely to submit comment letters that opposed the MSR 
provision. 
We then use the 10% threshold to create a difference-in-difference research design that 
examines whether the banks above the threshold acted differently than other banks following the 
announcement of Basel III. To do so, we divide the post-announcement period into three distinct 
time periods, namely: 1) “Basel”, 2) “FedReserve”, and 3) “Adopted”.2 Consistent with affected 
banks taking a multi-faceted, simultaneous response, we find that the banks above the threshold: 
                                                          
1 We refer the reader to Section 3.1 for a more detailed discussion of this setting, including a discussion of the costs 
associated with each of the channels available to respond to this particular provision. 
2 These dates are defined as follows: the Basel time period begins after the Basel Committee released the initial 
consultative document for Basel III (December, 2009) and ends when the details of the regulatory standards were 
agreed upon by the Basel Committee’s oversight body (December, 2010). The FedReserve period then begins and 
extends through the date that the Federal Reserve approved a final rule based on the Basel Committee’s proposed 
framework (June, 2013). The Adopted period then begins and extends through the final mandatory compliance date 
for FDIC-supervised banks (January 1, 2015). Table 1 provides a more detailed description of the various regulatory 
announcements related to Basel III. 
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1) reduced their use of the OTD model to a greater extent, 2) had larger declines in the amount of 
mortgages that they were servicing and 3) had larger declines in the valuation multiples applied 
to their mortgage servicing portfolios.  Additionally, we find that this reaction generally 
intensified throughout each of the three post-announcement periods. Finally, we find that 
approximately 50% of banks’ reduction in their MSR to Tier1 capital ratios occurred prior to the 
Federal Reserve officially adopting the regulation.   
While our results indicate that firms quickly respond to regulatory proposals through 
multiple channels, it is not obvious which firms would make these costly changes to comply with 
regulations that have not yet been enacted. To better understand the incentives for such behavior, 
we reference theories related to investment under uncertainty that frame the investment timing 
decision as a choice between having the benefit that arises from early commitment or the benefit 
of having the additional information (Bernanke 1983, Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Considering this 
framework, we perform cross-sectional tests that exploit variation in public vs. private banks and 
bank size.  The results of these tests suggest that the anticipatory response was concentrated in 
banks that: 1) benefitted more from signaling an early commitment, or 2) had less uncertainty 
about whether they would be subjected to the regulation.  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we provide evidence that 
firms’ incentives may lead them to respond concurrently across multiple channels when faced 
with regulatory uncertainty. While prior research shows that firms immediately respond to 
proposed regulation by lobbying rule makers to alter the terms towards the firm’s own economic 
interests (Zimmerman and Watts 1978, Deakin 1989), our findings suggest that firms do not wait 
until the uncertainty is resolved before taking actions to comply with the proposal. 
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 Second, our study highlights that the appropriate date for an event study may be the 
announcement of the regulation rather than its adoption or implementation. While many studies 
use changes in regulation as an exogenous shock in quasi-experimental research designs (Larker 
and Rusticus 2010), our finding that firms take immediate actions to comply with a proposed 
regulation indicates that such a design would understate the regulation’s estimated impact. Given 
that economic effects are of first-order importance when examining the effects of regulation 
(Leuz and Wysocki 2015), our study urges researchers to carefully consider whether 
policymakers signaled, leaked, or otherwise released information related to the regulation in 
order to avoid false inferences about the significance and/or magnitude of the regulation being 
studied (MacKinlay 1997; McWilliams and Siegel 1997).  
Third, we contribute to the fair value accounting literature by providing empirical 
evidence that managerial incentives can significantly influence an asset’s reported fair value. Our 
finding that MSR valuations decreased for banks above the 10% threshold when Basel III was 
proposed combines with Barth et al. (2012) and Dechow et al (2009) to dispel the widespread 
belief that fair value accounting precludes firms from manipulating earnings and/or regulatory 
capital (Healy and Wahlen 1999). However, unlike those prior studies which examine total 
accruals, our study focuses on a specific accrual to examine accrual-based earnings management 
(Graham et al. 2005). By examining a specific accrual, rather than aggregate accruals, our study 
is better designed to identify the discretionary component (McNichols 2000).  
Finally, our study joins others in providing regulators with timely information about the 
impact of Basel III (e.g., Angelini et al. 2011; Repullo and Saurina Salas 2011). Specifically, we 
show that banks responded by making significant operational and financial reporting changes 
well in advance of the implementation date. Further, by showing that banks used their financial 
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reporting discretion to lower the MSR valuations after the proposal of Basel III, our study raises 
concerns that banks were able to circumvent a portion of the business model changes intended by 
the new regulation. Given the importance of this reform, and the limited research to date, we join 
Beatty and Liao (2013) in calling for additional research on this topic.  
2. Background 
2.1 Related Research 
 Regulatory uncertainty arises due to the unpredictable actions of governmental agencies 
or regulatory bodies that create and enforce regulations (Birnbaum 1984). Prior research has 
generally concluded that firms lobby regulatory agencies based on their own self-interests to 
minimize negative economic consequences that might impact the firm if the proposed rule were 
to be implemented (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, Deakin 1989, Johnston and Jones 2006). While 
regulators commonly allow 30 to 60 days for constituents to comment on the proposals, firms 
face much longer periods of uncertainty while their comments are considered and debated prior 
to the issuance of the final rule.3 
Firms faced with proposed regulation must decide how they will respond to the 
uncertainty that exists during the rulemaking process. In making this decision, firms weigh the 
benefits of an early commitment versus the benefits of waiting for additional information to be 
revealed (Bernanke 1983, Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Given that firms’ lobbying efforts are often 
able to influence regulatory outcomes (Bozanic et al., 2012), firms may rationally place 
                                                          
3 For example, we examined all final rules issued by the SEC between 2001 – 2011 from the SEC’s website and 
found that the average time between a rule proposal and its final date was 313 days. We also found that 29.7% of the 
rules issued had rule making processes in excess of one year.  
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significant value on the option to wait for additional information to be revealed. Consistent with 
firms highly valuing this option, McDonald and Siegel (1986) use simulations to show that even 
moderate amounts of uncertainty can double a firm’s required rate of return when making 
investment and scrapping decisions. Bloom et al. (2007) extend this finding by providing 
evidence that this preference to wait for the additional information extends to instances where the 
costs incurred from an early response are partially reversible. Further evidence of this relation, 
that uncertainty sharply reduces firms’ investment levels, is also found in several recent 
empirical papers within the economics and finance literature (e.g., Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 
2015, Born and Pfeifer 2014, Fabrizio 2012, Julio and Yook 2012).  
A recent paper in this literature, Baker et al., (2015), has been particularly influential in 
that it develops a proxy for policy-related economic uncertainty. The authors show that this 
measure spikes following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in October 2008, and remains at 
an elevated level throughout much of the credit crisis that followed. Using this measure, Gulen 
and Ion (2015) estimate that two-thirds of the drop in corporate investments observed during the 
recent financial crisis can be attributed directly to policy-related uncertainty. Gissler et al. (2016) 
also provide evidence that regulatory uncertainty had a large impact during this time period by 
showing that banks facing greater regulatory uncertainty issued fewer loans (and in smaller 
amounts). These studies combine to indicate that the uncertainty introduced in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis led firms to highly value the option to postpone their investment decisions.   
Firms that take a wait-and-see approach when responding to proposed regulation remove 
the risk that they incur unnecessary costs by complying with standards that ultimately will not 
apply to them. However, as noted previously, they do so at the expense of being able to realize 
the benefits associated with early commitment. These benefits include, but are not limited to: 
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having additional time to make the required changes, avoiding the scrutiny of regulators, and 
spreading the transition costs over an extended period of time. Further, firms responding early 
are able to send a valuable signal to regulators and investors that the firm is compliant with a 
more stringent set of regulatory standards (Akerlof 1970). Particular to the financial crisis, Ben 
Bernanke noted that “out of maybe the thirteen, thirteen of the most important financial 
institutions in the United States, twelve were at risk of failure.” Accordingly, in this highly 
uncertain environment, banks may have placed significant value on the option to send a positive 
signal related to their financial health and stability.  
3. Research Design and Data 
3.1 Research design 
 The objective of this paper is to examine how firms respond to proposed regulation. To 
answer these questions in an idealized experimental setting, we would prefer to have two 
randomly selected groups of firms that are identical in every respect except that one group is 
subject to proposed regulation (treatment group) while the other group is not (control group). 
Because we are unable to construct such a randomized experiment, we use a difference-in-
difference research design that is less susceptible to omitted correlated variable problems than 
many other research designs. We also include firm fixed-effects in all regressions to further 
reduce the possibility that our results are driven by omitted correlated variables (Amir et al. 
2015). Finally, we utilize a balanced panel of firms to avoid concerns that our results are driven 
by changes in the composition of the two groups (Shadish et al. 2002). The theoretical strength 
of our research design is that alternative explanations for our empirical findings must be that 
changes occurred in one group but not the other at the same time as the treatment. 
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 Our use of this research design requires us to identify a setting in which a proposed 
regulation threatens to impose differing levels of costs on firms. To capture these differential 
costs, we utilize a single provision included in the proposal of Basel III. 4  This provision 
proposed that all mortgage-servicing-rights (“MSRs”) be deducted from Tier 1 capital, with a 
subsequent revision proposing to limit MSRs to 10% of Tier 1 capital and increase their risk-
weighting from 100% to 250% (Basel Committee 2009, 2010a, 2010b).  These proposed changes 
threatened to increase the regulatory costs associated with holding MSRs by an estimated 63% 
before taking the 10% limitation into consideration (Mortgage Bankers Association 2012).  
Assuming the 10% limitation is breached, the increase in the new regulatory costs would be 
considerably higher than 63%. 5  This provision allows us to examine our research question 
because it gives banks above the 10% threshold a much larger incentive to reduce their MSRs 
relative to other banks that are below the 10% threshold. Accordingly, we divide the value of 
each bank’s MSRs by an estimate of its Basel III Tier 1 capital as of December 31, 2009 and set 
an indicator variable (RegPressure) equal to one if this ratio exceeds 10%, zero otherwise.6  
INSERT FIGURE 1 
                                                          
4 Basel III was proposed with the purpose of establishing a global regulatory framework that would strengthen the 
stability of the financial system by increasing bank liquidity and decreasing leverage (Wellink 2011). The magnitude 
of the changes included in the proposal of Basel III and the lengthy regulatory process in the United States combined 
create a scenario in which U.S. banks would not be required to implement Basel III until several years after the 
proposal. However, industry experts estimated that “more than two-thirds of [the impact to ROE from Basel III] has 
already been reflected in current ROE levels, as many banks have anticipated regulatory demands and reached 
Basel III requirements before the deadline” (Boston Consulting Group 2013). 
5 Appendix B provides a simple example from the Mortgage Banking Association’s comment letter to the Federal 
Reserve that details how the proposed changes result in a 63% increase in the regulatory capital costs associated 
with holding MSRs in the proposed Basel III environment. 
6 Because Basel III was not yet enacted for the vast majority of our study, we are unable to use the bank’s self-
reported Tier 1 capital under Basel III for this calculation. Rather, we estimate this amount by using the calculation 
outlined in Federal Reserve testimony before the US banking committee (Gibson 2012).  
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Having created a variable that potentially captures the differential pressure applied to 
banks from the proposed regulation, we then divide Basel III’s post-announcement period into 
three separate time periods to determine at what point during the regulatory process banks began 
to respond to the proposed regulation. Specifically, we use key dates in the regulatory process 
(selected from Table 1) to create three distinct post-announcement periods, namely: 1) “Basel”, 
2) “FedReserve”, and 3) “Adopted”. The Basel time period begins after the Basel Committee 
released the initial consultative document for Basel III (December, 2009) and ends when the 
details of the regulatory standards were agreed upon by the Basel Committee’s oversight body 
(December, 2010). The FedReserve period begins immediately after the Basel period ends and 
extends until the date that the Federal Reserve approved a final rule based on the Basel 
Committee’s proposed Basel III framework (June, 2013). The Adopted period begins 
immediately after the FedReserve period ends and extends through the final mandatory 
compliance date for FDIC-supervised banks (January 1, 2015). We then create indicator 
variables that take the value of one if a bank’s reported financial information falls within one of 
these periods, zero otherwise. The interaction of any of these three time periods with the 
RegPressure variable can then be used as an independent variable in our difference-in-difference 
design to capture the treatment effect as of that period of time.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
This setting has several features that make it an attractive one to answer our research 
question. First, we are able to observe political, operating, and financial reporting decisions 
related to MSRs that banks made in the wake of the proposed regulation. Specifically, we are 
able to examine the content of their comment letters submitted to rule makers. We are also able 
to observe whether banks’ business models were altered in ways that would reduce their MSRs. 
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Specifically, banks could: 1)  reduce their use of the OTD lending model in order to allow runoff 
of their MSR portfolio, or 2) sell their servicing portfolios to another party.7 Lastly, banks may 
desire to maintain their existing business model but avoid their exposure to the proposed 
regulation. In our setting, we are able to examine whether banks pursue this behavior because 
MSRs are primarily accounted for as Level 3 assets and thus require management inputs to 
determine their valuation (Altamuro and Zhang 2013). 8  Because these MSR valuations (a 
subjective amount) can be compared to the amount of loans serviced (an objective amount), we 
are able to make inferences about strategic financial reporting by observing whether the ratio of 
these two amounts exhibit unusual behavior after the announcement of Basel III. 
Second, each of the operational and financial reporting responses outlined above would 
be expected to lower bank profitability. This is useful in our identification strategy because 
profit-maximizing banks would be unlikely to voluntarily take these actions in the absence of 
external pressure (e.g., the proposed regulation). Specifically, the OTD lending model is highly 
                                                          
7 It is important to note that a liquid secondary market for MSRs had not existed for several years leading up to 
Basel III’s proposal (Kothari and Lester 2012). However, shortly after the announcement, non-bank servicers began 
to surface in response to this newly created market opportunity. For example, Nationstar, currently one of the five 
largest mortgage servicers in the country, had their initial public offering on March 8, 2012. On page 2 of their 
registration statement, they note “In the aftermath of the U.S. financial crisis, the residential mortgage industry is 
undergoing major structural changes that affect the way mortgage loans are originated, owned and serviced. These 
changes have benefited and should continue to significantly benefit non-bank mortgage servicers. Banks currently 
dominate the residential mortgage servicing industry, servicing over 90% of all residential mortgage loans as of 
September 30, 2011…However, banks are currently under tremendous pressure to exit or reduce their exposure to 
the mortgage servicing business as a result of increased regulatory scrutiny and capital requirements.” 
8 The Federal Housing Finance Association (FHFA) describes the valuation process that banks use to determine the 
Level 3 asset values for their MSRs. Specifically, they state: “In estimating the fair value of MSRs, market 
participants generally use a Level 3 model-based fair value approach.. As a result, the valuation techniques used to 
estimate the fair value of Level 3 instruments involve significant unobservable inputs, which generally are more 
subjective and involve a high degree of management judgment and assumptions.. Market participants have a broad 
range of views of these assumptions resulting in fair values that have a wide range due to the lack of price 
transparency (Servicing Compensation Initiative 2011). Consistent with this description, Hendricks and 
Shakespeare (2013) observe variation in the prepayment assumption used by large banks and Cochran et al. (2004) 
finds that the MSR valuation multiple ranges from 0% to3.8% of a loan’s UPB. Thus, banks have both the ability 
and incentive to reduce their MSR valuations following the proposal of Basel III.  
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profitable in that it provides banks with non-interest income in the form of origination fees. 
Stiroh (2004) documents that banks have increasingly pursued non-interest income since the 
1980’s as it provides greater profit margins than traditional lending. In regards to banks’ 
servicing portfolios, banks highly value servicing mortgages because it allows them to use the 
monthly contact with customers to cross-sell other products and services offered by the bank.9 
Further, a bank’s decision to sell a portion of its servicing portfolio has a negative impact on the 
profitability of the retained portion since servicing is subject to significant economies of scale 
(Hendricks and Shakespeare 2013). Finally, reductions in MSR valuations primarily occur by 
writing down existing MSRs which also lowers current profitability. 
Third, the proposal of Basel III occurred more than a year after the events that are most 
commonly associated with the onset of the financial crisis.10 This extended period between the 
regulation and the events that gave rise to the regulation is important in our ability to attribute 
any observed changes in behavior to the proposed regulation rather than the crisis (e.g., since 
those effects would have begun to manifest in earlier periods). Given the importance in ruling 
out this alternative explanation, we perform several tests to identify whether the relations 
predicted in this paper began prior to Basel III’s proposal.11  
                                                          
9 Consistent with this idea, JPMorgan Chase purchased $70 billion of MetLife’s servicing portfolio on November 6, 
2012. In doing so, Eric Schuppenhauer, Head of Mortgage Servicing at Chase, noted a motivation for the deal was to 
“be able to provide our full range of products and services to an additional 350,000 individuals and families.” 
10 Specifically, the following events all took place between 12-18 months prior to Basel III’s proposal: 1) The 
government took control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on Sept 7, 2008, 2) Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy 
on Sept 15, 2008, 3) The Federal Reserve extends an $85 billion credit facility to stabalize AIG on Sept 17, 2008, 4) 
Congress approved a $700 billion bank bailout plan (TARP) on Oct 3, 2008, 5) The Federal Reserve again steps in 
to stabalize AIG by offering an additional $38 billion credit facility, and 6) The National Bureau of Economic 
Research declares the United States economy to be in recession on Dec 11, 2008. 
11 We refer the reader to Section 3.2 (discussion of Table 2, Panel B) and Section 5.3 (discussion of Table 10) for a 
full explanation of the analyses that we performed. In each test, we fail to find evidence that the relations observed 
in this paper began prior to Basel III’s announcement. 
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3.2 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
As documented in Panel A of Table 2, our primary sample consists of quarterly 
observations of U.S. commercial bank holding companies from 2007-2014 that meet the 
following criteria: (1) non-missing values for each variable, (2) an MSR balance greater than 
zero, and (3) mortgage-servicing portfolios of at least $1 million. We obtain our data from bank 
holding companies’ quarterly call reports (Form Y-9C) which can be accessed from the 
Compustat Bank Regulatory Database or the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago website.  
INSERT TABLE 2 
A subsequent analysis requires detailed disclosures about each bank’s MSR portfolio. 
Accordingly, for these analyses, we restrict our sample to include only the publicly-traded banks 
that include MSR rollforwards in their Form 10-K filings. By hand-collecting this data, we are 
able to obtain more detailed information about the specific components of servicing portfolios. 
Table 2, Panel B documents the impact of these two additional restrictions on our sample. 
Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics for our primary sample. Panel A includes the 
mean, median, interquartile range, and standard deviation for each variable while Panel B 
provides the correlation coefficients across each variable.12 As documented in Panel A, 9.6% of 
the 5,311 sample observations are identified as RegPressure banks.13  Panel C examines the 
similarity between the RegPressure group of banks and the control banks as of December 31, 
                                                          
12 The detailed descriptions for each variable in our study are provided as part of Appendix A. 
13 9.6% of our sample observations equates to 16 of the 166 banks in our final sample. These banks, and their state 
of headquarters, are: Arvest Bank Group, Inc (AR), Bank of America Corporation (NC), BB&T Corporation (NC), 
Central of Kansas, Inc (KS), Central Pacific Financial Corp. (HI), First Horizon National Corporation (TN), 
Independent Bank Corporation (MI), Independent Bankers Financial Corporation (TX), JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
(NY), Marine Bancorp, Inc. (IL), Merchants Financial Group, Inc. (MN), Park Bancorporation (WI), Suntrust 
Banks, Inc. (GA), Trinity Capital Corporation (NM), U.S. Bancorp (MN), and Wells Fargo & Company (CA). 
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2009. Given that a substantial portion of the MSR market has historically been held by the 
largest banks (Hendricks and Shakespeare, 2013), it is not surprising that Panel C reveals several 
differences between the two groups of banks. However, these differences (in levels) do not 
invalidate our research design because the critical assumption of the difference-in-difference 
approach is that of parallel trends, which posits that the average change in the control group 
represents the counterfactual change in the treatment group if there were no treatment. While the 
treatment prohibits this assumption from being tested directly, we conduct pretest comparisons 
of the dependent variables by examining the quarterly changes (i.e., trends) during the period 
leading up to the Basel III announcement. As documented in Panel D, we find no statistically 
significant differences in the average quarterly changes observed between the treatment and 
control banks during the pre-test period. These findings, combined with our perfectly balanced 
panel of banks, provide some assurance that the parallel trends assumption is met.   
INSERT TABLE 3 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Banks’ response to the announcement of Basel III – Lobbying 
We begin our empirical analysis by examining whether RegPressure banks lobbied Basel III rule 
makers (the Basel Committee and the Federal Reserve) regarding the treatment of MSRs to a 
greater extent than did other banks. Because the scope of the Basel III proposals was so broad, it 
may be that all banks had cause to lobby rule makers about some portion of the proposed 
regulation. Thus, it is not sufficient to simply examine whether the RegPressure banks were 
more likely to submit a comment letter, but rather whether the comment letters that they 
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submitted were more likely to oppose the proposed treatment of MSRs. Accordingly, we 
examine for this differential behavior by estimating the following linear probability model: 
 𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + ∑𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀                                (1) 
where Lobby is defined as : Letter or Oppose. Letter is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of one if the bank submitted a letter to rule makers, zero otherwise. Oppose is an indicator 
variable takes the value of one if the bank submitted a letter to rule makers that opposed the 
proposed treatment of MSRs, zero otherwise.14 RegPressure is our primary variable of interest 
and is as previously defined in Section 3.1.  
 We also include several control variables in the model to reduce concerns that our results 
are driven by omitted correlated variables. Specifically, we include variables in the model that 
capture each bank’s size (Ln_Assets), profitability (ROE), business model (Residential), and 
complexity (RevMix). We also include state-level macroeconomic conditions (Unemployment) to 
capture the role that the bank’s local economy plays in the manager’s decision to lobby rule 
makers. For this, and all subsequent specifications, standard errors are clustered by bank. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
The results of estimating Equation 1 are provided in Table 4. Consistent with our 
expectation, Column 1 indicates that the banks above the 10% threshold were not more likely to 
submit a comment letter in response to Basel III’s proposal. However, Column 2 provides 
                                                          
14 We took a two step process in creating this variable. First, we searched the text of all comment letters received by 
the Basel Committee or the Federal Reserve regarding Basel III for “MSR”, “mortgage servicing right”, “MSA”, or 
“mortgage servicing asset.” When identified, we read through the letter to determine whether the comment letter 
opposed the proposed treatment. In all cases, we found that letters referencing any of these four terms were in 
opposition to the proposed treatment. Appendix C includes excerpts from all nine RegPressure banks that submitted 
comment letters. Their comments reveal that MSRs played a highly valuable role in these banks’ business models.  
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evidence that these banks were more likely to submit a comment letter opposing the proposed 
treatment of MSRs. The magnitude of this finding is highly significant as the predicted 
probability of submitting a comment letter opposing the proposed treatment of MSRs increases 
by 32.41% for RegPressure banks. The magnitude of this result is similarly large when only 
considering the 58 banks in our sample that submitted comment letters during the rule making 
process. Specifically, Column 3 indicates that, conditional on submitting a comment letter to rule 
makers, the predicted probability of the comment letter opposing the proposed treatment of 
MSRs increases by 28.36%. Taken together, Table 4 provides strong support for our 
identification strategy by showing that the RegPressure banks lobbied rule makers against the 
MSR provision to a greater extent than did other banks.  
4.2 Banks’ response to the announcement of Basel III – Timing  
Having shown that RegPressure banks were more likely to lobby rule makers against the 
proposed treatment of MSRs, we turn our focus to understanding whether they were also 
simultaneously responding to the proposed regulation through other channels. Section 3.1 
identifies three primary channels that the RegPressure banks could have utilized to reduce their 
exposure to the proposed regulation. These channels include: reducing their use of the OTD 
lending model, selling a portion of their MSR holdings, and reducing the valuations applied to 
MSRs. Accordingly, we examine whether and when the banks above the 10% threshold began to 
exhibit any of these differential behaviors following Basel III’s proposal. 
We begin our analysis by examining the average of the treatment and control banks’ 
quarterly MSR balance relative to their MSR balances when the initial consultative document for 
Basel III was released. We perform this analysis to get a better understanding of how MSRs were 
impacted, regardless of the channel, after the announcement of Basel III. While Figure 2 shows 
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that MSR balances for the treatment and control groups exhibited similar behavior prior to the 
announcement of Basel III, they began to diverge shortly after the announcement was made. 
Further, the divergence begins in the Basel period and grows larger as the implementation date 
for Basel III approaches, suggesting that the RegPressure banks made an initial, but not complete, 
response to the proposed regulation when it was first announced.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 
To better understand if the RegPressure banks took deliberate actions to reduce their 
MSR balances after the proposal of Basel III, we move beyond a univariate plot and use the 
research design outlined in Section 3.1. Specifically, we use OLS to estimate the following 
difference-in-difference specification: 
𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 
+𝛽4𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 
+𝛽6𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖  (2) 
where Behavior is one of the three specific behaviors that bank managers could take to reduce 
their MSRs, namely OTD, UPB, or MSR_UPB. OTD measures the ratio of loans originated for 
resale during the quarter scaled by the beginning of the quarter mortgage loans (Purnanandam 
2011).  UPB is the natural log of the total quarter-end unpaid principle balance of loans serviced 
for others and reflects the balance of loans (not on the bank’s balance sheet) that the bank 
services on behalf of other entities that hold the loans.  MSR_UPB is the reported value of a 
bank’s MSRs divided by the UPB of the associated servicing portfolio. Basel, FedReserve, and 
Adopted are indicator variables that take the value of one if the bank’s financial information is 
for a quarter ending between Jan 2010-Dec 2010, Jan 2011-Jun 2013, or Jul 2013-Dec 2014, 
respectively; zero otherwise. Our primary variables of interest in this equation are the interaction 
of RegPressure with each of these indicator variables. All other variables included in the model 
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are as previously motivated in Section 4.1, and as defined in Appendix A. We also include bank 
fixed effects in this, and all subsequent, specifications to create a within-bank research design. 
INSERT TABLE 5 
Table 5 contains the results of estimating Equation 2.15 Consistent with the RegPressure 
banks immediately altering their behavior following the proposal in ways that would reduce their 
exposure to the proposed regulation, the estimated coefficient for 𝛽4 is negative and statistically 
significant in each of the three columns. Further, and consistent with the relationship depicted in 
Figure 2, the estimated coefficients for 𝛽5 and 𝛽6 continue to decline relative to 𝛽4. This pattern 
suggests that the banks made only a partial response when the regulation was initially proposed, 
perhaps waiting for uncertainty to be resolved before incurring the full amount of transition costs.  
Overall, the results described above reject the null hypothesis that firms wait until the 
rule making process is completed before making costly operational and financial reporting 
changes.  In addition to being statistically significant, the results are also economically 
significant, even in the period immediately after the initial Basel announcement (the Basel period 
in our study).  For example, the difference-in-difference results in column 3 of Table 5 suggest 
that RegPressure banks reduced their OTD activity 11.5%, their UPB level 0.74%, and their 
MSR valuation 9.8% more than the control banks did during the Basel period.  These results 
suggest that banks were more aggressive in reducing their OTD activity and their MSR 
valuations than they were in reducing their UPB level. The ranking of these magnitudes (OTD 
                                                          
15 Note that because RegPressure remains constant across all quarters for a given bank, it is subsumed by the bank 
fixed effect and is therefore not reported as a main effect in the tables. 
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being the largest and UPB being the smallest) is also being consistent throughout the FedReserve 
and Adoption periods.  
4.3 Banks’ response to the announcement of Basel III – Incentives 
 The results discussed in Section 4.2 raise the question of why banks would make costly 
operational and financial reporting changes in response to regulation that has not yet been 
adopted. To answer this question, we reference theories related to investment under uncertainty 
that frame the investment timing decision as a choice between having the benefit that arises from 
early commitment or the benefit of having the additional information (Bernanke 1983). Given 
this tradeoff that firms face when deciding when to respond to potential regulation, we predict 
that our result is primarily driven by firms that: 1) benefitted more from signaling an early 
commitment, or 2) had less uncertainty about whether they would be subjected to the regulation. 
4.3.1 Cross-sectional variation in the benefit received from early adoption 
 As noted in Section 2.1, one benefit from early adoption of a proposed regulation is that 
the firm is able to send a valuable signal to regulators and investors about the firm (Akerlof 
1970). In our setting, this signal pertains to a bank’s Tier 1 capital, the core measure of its 
financial strength. The Basel Committee recognizes the importance that investors place on this 
signal as they include market discipline as one of the three pillars of the Basel framework. In 
doing so, they note that “market discipline imposes strong incentives on banks to conduct their 
business in a safe, sound and efficient manner, including an incentive to maintain a strong capital 
base as a cushion against potential future losses arising from risk exposures (Basel 2001).” 
Consistent with banks understanding the importance placed on their Tier 1 capital, Allen et al., 
(2011) identify market discipline as one of the forces that induce banks to hold positive capital. 
Given that public banks are subjected to greater market discipline than private banks (Beatty et al.  
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2002), we conjecture that the publicly traded banks stand to benefit more from early adoption 
relative to their privately held counterparts. Accordingly, we partition our sample into publicly 
traded banks and privately traded banks and re-estimate Equation 2 for each of the two partitions. 
Our prediction is that the rapid changes in operational and financial reporting behavior 
documented in Table 5 are concentrated among the publicly traded banks.  
INSERT TABLE 6 
 Table 6 contains the results of this analysis. Consistent with our prediction, the results of 
estimating Equation 2 within the partition of publicly traded banks (Columns 1a, 2a, and 3a) 
reveal that all the coefficients maintain the same sign as documented in Table 5. In fact, the 
results in these columns are stronger than those presented in Table 5, suggesting that the 
differential behavior exhibited by the privately-held RegPressure banks was not as pronounced 
as it was by the publicly traded RegPressure banks. Consistent with this reasoning, we observe 
that the interaction of RegPressure with the various post-announcement periods is never 
significantly different from zero in any of the regressions within the partition of privately traded 
banks (Columns 1b, 2b, and 3b) except for the Adopted period when the uncertainty has been 
resolved. Taken together, and to the extent that our public/private partition proxies for the 
differential value associated with signaling to investors, our results indicate that greater benefits 
associated with signaling an early commitment may entice firms to forego the sequential pecking 
order approach that is generally assumed when firms are faced with regulatory uncertainty.  
4.3.2 Cross-sectional variation in banks’ uncertainty about being subjected to the regulation.  
 Given that firms’ lobbying efforts may influence rule makers to alter or abandon the 
proposed regulation, firms risk incurring unnecessary costs when they make costly operational 
changes to comply with proposed regulation. Accordingly, much of the value associated with 
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waiting to respond arises because firms are able to remove this risk if they wait for the final 
regulatory terms to be settled. To the extent that firms have different levels of uncertainty about 
eventually being subjected to the proposed regulation, firms with more uncertainty stand to 
benefit to a greater extent from waiting for the rulemaking process to be completed relative to 
firms with less uncertainty.  
 In our setting, the initial Basel III consultative documents indicated that the first “key 
element” of the new framework was to “ensure that large, internationally active banks are in a 
better position to absorb losses” (Basel Committee 2009, pp. 2). This focus on reforming the 
large banks was also a theme of the Dodd-Frank Act that was also introduced in December 2009. 
This piece of legislation proposed that all financial companies with total assets greater than $10 
billion be subject to semi-annual stress tests, which would be reported to the Federal Reserve. If 
this focus on large, interconnected financial institutions led smaller banks to be more uncertain 
that they would be subjected to the proposed Basel III reforms, then we would expect that they 
would not act as quickly in responding to the proposed regulation.16 To test this prediction, we 
partition our sample based on the $10 billion total asset threshold and re-estimate Equation 2 for 
each of these partitions.17 Our prediction is that the rapid changes in operational and financial 
reporting behavior documented in Table 5 are concentrated among the large banks that had less 
uncertainty that they would ultimately be subjected to the proposed regulation.  
                                                          
16 Note that the Federal Reserve generally regards banks below the $10 billion asset threshold as community banks, 
which were believed by many in the banking industry to be beyond the scope of Basel III. However, the Federal 
Reserve’s proposal of Basel III in June, 2012 surprised many community banks by only excluding those banks 
below $500 million of assets (Touryalai, 2012). In our review of comment letters, many institutions argued that this 
amount should be increased to include all banks below the Federal Reserve’s general definition of $10 billion.  
17 The correlation between this size-based indicator and the public/private indicator used in Table 6 is 0.25.  This is 
indicative of some overlap between the partitions in both tables, but the relatively low magnitude of the correlation 
suggests that the size and public/private partitions are capturing different constructs. 
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INSERT TABLE 7 
 Table 7 contains the results of this analysis. Consistent with our prediction, the results of 
estimating Equation 2 within the partition of large banks (Columns 1a, 2a, and 3a) are 
qualitatively similar to those results documented in Table 5. On the other hand, and similar to our 
analysis within the partition of private banks in Table 6, we observe that 𝛽4 and 𝛽5 are never 
significantly different from zero in any of the regressions within the partition of smaller banks 
(Columns 1b, 2b, and 3b). However, and in support of our identification strategy, we do observe 
that 𝛽6, the interaction of Adoption and RegPressure, is negative and statistically significant for 
the operational changes. Thus, these banks did behave differentially than their peer firms after 
Basel III was proposed, albeit only after the Federal Reserve had removed the uncertainty 
associated with the regulation. Taken together, and to the extent that our partition on firm size 
captures managers’ uncertainty about being subjected to the proposed regulation, these results 
indicate that firms are less likely to make anticipatory changes to proposed regulation when they 
stand to benefit more from having the additional information that is set to be revealed. 
5. Additional analyses and robustness tests 
5.1 Banks’ differential response to the announcement of Basel III—Valuation mechanisms 
 Our results indicate that banks promptly altered both their operational and financial 
reporting decisions in response to the MSR provision included in the proposal of Basel III. While 
regulators may have included this provision in an effort to ultimately alter firms’ operational 
decisions, the financial reporting changes identified in this paper are perhaps both surprising and 
unintended. Accordingly, we further examine the financial reporting changes to better 
understand the mechanisms by which banks reduced their MSR valuations. 
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To reduce a bank’s aggregate MSR valuation, managers must either: (1) increase the 
amortization rate for their existing MSRs, or (2) lower the capitalization rates for new MSRs. 
Comparing these two mechanisms, amortization rate increases will reduce MSR holdings more 
quickly than lowering capitalization rates because the amortization rates can be applied to the 
bank’s entire portfolio of MSRs whereas the capitalization rate is only applicable to the newly 
created MSRs. If the RegPressure banks reduced the valuation of their MSRs then we should be 
able to see that they used either one or both of these mechanisms.  
As discussed in Section 3.2, this granular information is not included in banks’ Y-9C 
filings, but it may be included in banks’ 10-K filings. Thus, we restrict our sample of banks to 
include only those banks that: (1) are publicly traded, and (2) contain a rollforward of their 
annual MSR activity in their 10-K filing. We then hand-collect the information about these banks’ 
servicing portfolios and tabulate the descriptive statistics for this reduced sample in Panel A of 
Table 8. Because we are restricted to using annual data for this test, a number of our observations 
fall into multiple periods. For example, a bank’s 2013 annual report contains information 
regarding both the FedReserve and Adopted time periods. Accordingly, we alter our design to 
only examine the pre-announcement period and the post-announcement periods. Because the 
initial consultative documents were released in December, 2009, we are able to use this research 
design without banks’ annual filings containing information from multiple periods. Using this 
information, we then use OLS to estimate the following model: 
𝑀𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 
+𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 (3) 
where Mechanismit is either: 1) AmortRate, which measures the percentage change in 
bank i’s MSRs that was driven by changes in the bank’s amortization rate or fair value 
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assumptions, or 2) CapRate which is the capitalization rate used to create MSRs from bank i’s 
new loan originations. Post is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 10-K is filed 
in either the Basel, FedReserve, or Adopted time periods. All other variables are as previously 
motivated and defined. 
INSERT TABLE 8 
 Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8, Panel B provide the results of estimating Equation 3. 
However, before we discuss those results, it is important for reasons of external validity to 
establish that the financial reporting discretion identified in Table 5 is also observed in our 
reduced sample of firms. Accordingly, Column 1 re-estimates Equation 2 (using MSR_UPB as 
the dependent variable) for this restricted sample of firms. Consistent with these firms utilizing 
their financial reporting discretion following the announcement of Basel III, the estimated 
coefficient on the Post*RegPressure variable is negative and statistically significant. The 
similarity of these results to those documented in Table 5 (with the full sample of firms) suggests 
that the analyses using the restricted sample are likely to generalize to the full sample of firms.   
Columns 2 (3) of Table 8, Panel B examines whether the RegPressure banks increased 
their amortization rate (capitalization rate) to a greater extent relative to other banks after the 
initial consultative document for Basel III were released. Consistent with RegPressure banks 
using these two mechanisms to reduce their MSR valuations, we find that β3 is estimated to be 
positive and statistically significant in both models. 18  In terms of economic magnitude, our 
                                                          
18  It may seem counter-intuitive that a bank would prefer to writedown an asset when faced with increased 
regulatory capital pressure. However, in this setting, a bank’s MSRs can only represent 10% of its tier 1 capital. 
Thus, the bank will be forced to reduce its common equity by the amount of MSR holdings that exceed 10%. The 
effect of this capital adjustment is equivalent to the bank writing down its MSR holdings to the 10% threshold. 
Further, a bank that takes the writedown will generally have a higher capital ratio in the future than it would if it 
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results suggest that RegPressure banks increased their amortization rates (capitalization rates) on 
average by 24.5% (5.1%) more than the control banks following the announcement of Basel III. 
Taken together, these results add support to our primary findings that bank managers with 
significant proportions of MSRs relative to Tier 1 capital engaged in strategic financial reporting 
to reduce the valuations of their MSRs following the announcement of Basel III.  
5.2 Performance analysis 
 Our findings suggest that RegPressure banks trade off increased profitability in the 
current period to improve their future capital ratios. This behavior is contrary to the extensive 
literature suggesting that managers generally exhibit myopic behavior (Stein 1989, Bushee 1998, 
Graham et al. 2005). In addition to the value received from sending a positive signal to regulators 
and investors about their regulatory capital, one reason that managers may be willing to record 
current period writedowns is because they are able to offset that income with other discretionary 
accruals.19 One accrual that banks could use for this purpose is the loan loss provision (LLP).  
 The LLP is the largest accrual on a bank’s balance sheet and, combined with its opacity, 
could provide RegPressure banks with an effective mechanism to offset their MSR writedowns. 
Consistent with this idea, prior research provides evidence that banks use their LLP to manage 
their regulatory capital levels (Beatty et al. 1995). In our setting, banks behaving in this manner 
(reducing their LLP to offset MSR writedowns) avoid the temporary reduction in operating 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
simply adjusted its regulatory capital because it will have lower amortization expense in future periods. This will 
then increase the profitability of servicing which will cause retained earnings to increase at a faster pace than it 
would otherwise.  
19 We use the term ‘writedowns’ in this section to refer to the mechanisms outlined in Section 5.1; namely, increased 
amortization rates for existing MSRs and reduced capitalization rates for new MSRs. These mechanims both reduce 
a bank’s current profitability in exchange for lower risk-weighted assets and increased future profitability. 
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performance that they would otherwise incur. Further, the lower risk-weighting associated with a 
bank’s outstanding loans relative to its MSRs will result in the bank having a higher tier 1 capital 
ratio in the current period if it were to engage in this strategic behavior.  Accordingly, we 
estimate the following equation to examine the possibility that RegPressure banks reduced their 
LLP to a greater extent than non-RegPressure banks following Basel III’s announcement: 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖  
+𝛽4𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 
+𝛽6𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖  (4) 
where 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the loan loss provision for bank 𝑖 in quarter 𝑡. Similar to our prior equations, this 
specification also employs a difference-in-difference research design with β4, β5, and β6 capturing 
the differential behavior of the RegPressure banks for various time periods after Basel III was 
announced. We also include each bank’s LLP from the prior quarter in addition to each variable 
suggested by Model (a) of Beatty and Liao (2013).20 All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 
INSERT TABLE 9 
 Model 1 of Table 9 provides the results of estimating Equation 4. Consistent with 
RegPressure banks using their LLP to offset some of the impact of writing down theirs MSRs, 
we observe that β4, β5, and β6 are all estimated to be negative at statistically significant levels. 
While this result is consistent with RegPressure banks engaging in this offsetting behavior, our 
research design is unable to identify that the lower LLP is the direct result of increased MSR 
writedowns. However, if the LLP is used as a “plug” (as is frequently suggested) to achieve a 
                                                          
20 Table 4 of Beatty and Liao (2013) examines whether the residuals from four LLP models used in prior research to 
examine discretionary accruals are able to predict whether a bank will either restate its financial statements or 
receive a comment letter from the SEC regarding its LLP. They find that their Model (a), which is based on the 
models of Bushman and Williams (2012) and Liu and Ryan (2006), provides the most explanatory power of the four 
models examined. Refer to Section 5.2 of Beatty and Liao (2013) for additional information.  
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certain amount of current operating income (Collins et al. 1995), then the fact that MSR 
writedowns are included in operating income indicates a causal relationship. 
 Model 1 suggests that RegPressure banks decreased their LLP to offset discretionary 
MSR writedowns following the announcement of Basel III. As noted previously, banks that 
engage in this offsetting behavior would seemingly be motivated by avoiding temporary declines 
in their operating performance. Thus, we examine how the operating performance of the 
RegPressure banks compared relative to the other banks after the announcement of Basel III: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖  
+𝛽4𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 
+𝛽6𝐴𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖  (5) 
where Performanceit is either: 1) ROAit, or 2) ROEit. Similar to prior equations, this specification 
employs a difference-in-difference methodology with β4, β5, and β6 capturing the differential 
behavior of the RegPressure banks for the time periods after Basel III was announced. We also 
include several control variables (as defined in Appendix A) and bank fixed effects in the model.  
 Models 2a and 2b of Table 9 provide the results of estimating Equation 5. In a review of 
our results, we fail to reject the null that RegPressure banks’ operating performance was 
different than other banks following the announcement of Basel III. Specifically, β4, β5, and β6 are 
never found to be statistically significant in either model. Despite the increased MSR writedowns 
documented in our study, these results combine with those in Table 5 to suggest that 
RegPressure banks were able to maintain their reported profitability while also reducing their 
risk-weighted assets. 
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5.3 Robustness – Financial crisis 
 One concern with our setting is that Basel III was introduced after the onset of the 
financial crisis. Thus, it is possible that the effects we’re attributing to Basel III’s proposal were 
in some way caused by the financial crisis, or one of the many programs enacted in its wake, 
rather than the MSR provision included in the proposal of Basel III. Our pretest comparisons in 
Panel D of Table 3 indicate that there were no observable differences in the dependent and 
independent variables during the pre-Basel III period between the two groups of banks. 
However, those tests are not capable of detecting trends within the pre-Basel III period which 
could have continued into the post-period and influenced our results. While Figure 2 suggests 
that this is not the case in regards to banks’ reported MSR balances, it is far from decisive on this 
matter. Accordingly, we perform a more careful investigation of this possibility. Specifically, we 
limit the sample to the two years prior to the announcement of Basel III and re-estimate Equation 
2 to determine whether the RegPressure banks began to display differential behavior in any of 
our dependent variables in the final year of the pre-Basel period. 
INSERT TABLE 10 
 The results of this estimation are included in Table 10. Our primary variable of interest is 
the interaction of RegPressure with Crisis, an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
observation is in the final year of the pre-Basel period, zero otherwise. In these analyses, we find 
no evidence that the RegPressure banks acted differently in regards to OTD, UPB, or MSR_UPB 
in the period leading up to Basel III’s announcement. While our tests are not able to establish 
causality that the results documented in our paper were driven by the Basel III provision, they do 
indicate that we are not simply capturing the continuation of a trend that had begun in the prior 
year and carried over into the post-announcement period. 
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5.4 Robustness – Continuous scale of regulatory pressure applied by the MSR provision 
 Our identification strategy is based on the provision included in the Basel III proposal 
that MSRs can only account for 10% of a bank’s Tier 1 capital. However, as noted by the 
Mortgage Bankers Association’s comment letter to the Federal Reserve on this issue, it is likely 
that banks will operate with a buffer to ensure that they do not exceed the 10% threshold 
(Mortgage Bankers Association 2012). Further, the proposed regulation imposes larger costs on 
those banks that are well above the 10% threshold relative to those banks that are only slightly 
above the 10% threshold. These two observations indicate that a continuous version of the 
RegPressure variable may be a more accurate representation of the pressure that each bank faces 
from the proposed regulation than the indicator variable used throughout our study. Based on this 
reasoning, we re-estimate Equation 2 using a continuous version of the RegPressure variable and 
find the inferences made in our study are unchanged when using this alternative definition. 
While the inferences are unchanged across all of our analyses when using the continuous 
variable, we present our results with the indicator variable to facilitate interpretation of the 
variable’s interaction with the post-Basel time periods. 
INSERT TABLE 11 
6. Conclusion 
Prior research suggests that investors immediately react to proposed regulatory changes 
(Lev, 1979). However, little is known about when and how managers respond to the uncertainty 
that the proposed regulation introduces into their operating environment. In this paper, provide 
evidence that firms’ incentives may lead them to respond concurrently across multiple channels 
when faced with regulatory uncertainty. While prior research shows that firms immediately 
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respond to proposed regulation by lobbying rule makers to alter the terms towards the firm’s own 
economic interests (Zimmerman and Watts 1978, Deakin 1989), our findings suggest that firms 
do not wait until the uncertainty is resolved before taking actions to comply with the proposal. 
Considering that economic effects are of first-order importance when examining effects of 
regulation (Leuz and Wysocki 2015), our findings urge researchers to carefully consider whether 
policymakers signaled, leaked, or otherwise released information related to the regulation in 
order to avoid false inferences about the significance and/or magnitude of the regulation being 
studied (MacKinlay 1997; McWilliams and Siegel 1997). Finally, our study provides regulators 
with timely information about the impact of Basel III. Considering the extreme importance of 
this reform, and the limited research performed to date, we join Beatty and Liao (2013) in calling 
for additional research in this area. 
Our results are subject to some limitations. First, there is generally a tradeoff between 
internal and external validity. To this point, Leuz and Wysocki (2015) note that “one could argue 
that studying the causal effects for a particular setting often amounts to a case study, at least, as 
far as the magnitude of the estimated treatment effect is concerned.” Thus, while we believe that 
our chosen setting allows for some causal inference to be made, it is not clear to what extent the 
magnitude or significance of the results extend to other institutional settings. Second, Basel III 
was proposed in response to the financial crisis. While we have chosen features of this regulation 
that are useful in order to establish causality (e.g., MSR provision, public vs private banks, large 
vs small banks), we recognize that there were many other institutional changes occurring during 
our study period that may have also impacted the dependent variables of interest. However, to 
the extent that these changes impacted both the treatment and control group in a similar manner 
then our difference-in-difference research design should mitigate these concerns. 
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Appendix A – Variable names and descriptions 
Variable Description 
  
Dependent Variables  
  
AmortRate 
Amortization (or fair value adjustment) of MSR for the quarter divided by beginning MSR 
balance plus newly originated MSRs and MSR purchases for the year. 
  
CapRate 
Estimate of the number of dollars of unpaid principal balance (UPB) per dollar of MSR 
for additions to the MSR balance for the quarter. Calculated as the natural log of the 
following:  
𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
=
∆𝑈𝑃𝐵𝑡  −  
𝑈𝑃𝐵𝑡−1
𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑡−1
(𝑀𝑆𝑅 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 𝑀𝑆𝑅 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑡 + 𝑀𝑆𝑅 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡)
𝑀𝑆𝑅 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
 
  
Letter 
Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the bank submitted a letter to rule makers, 
zero otherwise. 
  
LetterMSR 
Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the bank submitted a letter to rule makers 
that opposed the proposed treatment of MSRs, zero otherwise. 
  
LLP Loan loss provision for the quarter scaled by lagged total loans. 
  
MSR_UPB MSR balance divided by unpaid principal balance (UPB), winsorized by year. 
  
OTD 
Measure of the extent of participation in the originate-to-distribute mortgage lending 
market, calculated as the ratio of loans originated for resale during the quarter scaled by 
the beginning of the quarter mortgage loans on the balance sheet. 
  
ROA Net income scaled by total assets as of the report date 
  
  
ROE Net income scaled by average total equity as of the report date 
UPB 
Natural log of total quarter-end unpaid principle balance (UPB) on loans serviced for 
others. 
  
Independent Variables  
  
Δ GDP Change in GDP for the quarter 
  
Δ Unemployment  Change in Unemployment for the quarter  
  
10YrBond  10-year Treasury Bond rate as of the report sheet date 
  
Adopted 
Indicator variable equal to 1 for report dates from July 1, 2013 through December 31, 
2014, and zero otherwise 
  
Basel 
Indicator variable equal to 1 for report dates from January 1, 2010 through December 31, 
2010, and zero otherwise 
  
CaseShiller Return on the Case Shiller Real Estate Index for the quarter 
  
Crisis 
Indicator variable defined only for the two years 2008 and 2009.  Equal to 1 in 2009 and 
zero in 2008. 
  
FedReserve 
Indicator variable equal to 1 for report dates from January 1, 2011 through June 30, 2013, 
and zero otherwise 
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Appendix A – Variable names and descriptions (Continued) 
Variable Description 
  
Independent Variables (cont.)  
  
Ln_Assets  Natural log of total assets. 
  
MSR_Tier1 
 MSR balance divided by an estimate of the Basel III Tier 1 Capital balance.  This 
estimate of Basel III Tier 1 Capital was calculated using the same methodology used by 
the Federal Reserve in its assessment of the potential impact of Basel III on bank capital 
adequacy ratios (Gibson, 2012). 
  
NPL Total non-performing loans scaled by lagged total loans. 
  
Post 
Indicator variable equal to 1 for all report dates after December 31, 2009, and zero 
otherwise 
  
RegPressure 
Equal to 1 if the bank’s ratio of MSR’s to estimated Basel III Tier 1 capital (MSR_Tier1) 
is greater than 10% as of December 31, 2009, and zero otherwise. This is a measure of the 
degree to which the bank would expect to be affected under proposed Basel III capital 
rules that penalize MSRs. The Basel Committee first indicated that it was seeking to 
penalize intangible assets, such as MSRs, in a consultative document that was released in 
mid-December 2009. 
  
Residential Total mortgage loans divided by total assets. 
  
RevMix Noninterest income divided by total income. 
  
Trend Trend variable that increases by one in each calendar quarter 
  
Unemployment  State-level unemployment rate from the Federal Reserve website 
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Appendix B – Impact of MSR provision included in Basel III on regulatory capital 
The following example was taken from pages 28–29 of the MBA’s 2012 comment letter to the 
Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC regarding the rules proposed for Basel III (MBA, 2012). The 
purpose of including this example as an appendix to our study is to illustrate how the new 
provisions regarding MSRs affect a bank’s regulatory capital requirement.  
 
Existing Automatic 10 Percent Haircut 
 
The 10 percent and 15 percent limits are in addition to the current 10 percent 
haircut that arose from the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991. 
 
Under present rules the effective capital that must be retained for MSRs is 17.2 
percent as follows: 
 Assume 8 percent minimum capital requirement to be adequately 
capitalized. 
 10 percent of the value is deducted and the remaining 90 percent is risk-
weighted at 100 percent. 
 This equates to a minimum capital requirement for MSRs of 17.2 percent 
(10 percent plus (90 percent times 8 percent)). 
 
Under the proposed rules, the required capital that would have to be maintained, 
not considering the 10 percent and 15 percent proposed limits, would be a 
whopping 28 percent as follows: 
 Assume 8 percent minimum capital requirement to be adequately 
capitalized. 
 10 percent of the value is deducted and the remaining 90 percent is risk-
weighted at 250 percent. 
 This equates to a minimum capital requirement of MSRs of 28 percent (10 
percent plus (90 percent times 20 percent)). 
 
This would increase the required capital for MSRs by 63 percent, without taking 
into consideration the 10 percent and 15 percent limitations in the proposed rule. 
If the Basel III 10 percent or 15 percent thresholds are breached, the minimum 
capital requirements skyrocket. Since foreign banks are not subject to the 10 
percent haircut, it puts U.S. banks on an unlevel playing field. This is contrary to 
the purpose of the Basel rules which is to put banks worldwide on a level playing 
field with respect to regulatory capital requirements. (MBA, 2012, pp. 28–29) 
 
  
 39 
 
Appendix C – Comment letter excerpts that oppose MSR treatment 
BB&T Corporation 
“The value of MSR assets was not a significant driver of industry difficulties during the recent crisis. The 
proposed 250% risk weight and threshold deduction treatment for MSR significantly increases the capital costs 
for this line of business. In particular, it strongly discourages building mortgage servicing capabilities beyond a 
certain limited scale which will increase the cost of mortgage credit and drive servicing activities out of the 
banking industry. Banks are strongly incented to hedge the value of MSR through the accounting treatment of 
the asset. The risk from MSR is net of the hedged exposure. We believe that the current treatment of MSR 
assets (100% risk weight and no threshold deduction) is effective and feel that a 250% risk weight is 
unwarranted.” 
JPMorgan Chase & Co.  
“JPMC believes that adopting the proposed capital standard for MSRs is inconsistent with the economic risk 
associated with the MSR asset. The Agencies' proposed substantial capital impact on MSR should be 
supported by data accounting for increases in credit risk attributable to MSRs. In fact, to our knowledge, MSR-
related weaknesses have not been a noteworthy contributor to bank credit risk or bank failures. Our experience 
does not support the high level of losses implied by the proposed capital requirement, nor are we aware of any 
model that would support such an increase in the capital associated with the MSR asset”  
The proposed MSR capital treatment, by substantially increasing the costs of servicing, could potentially 
reduce the depth and capacity of the pool of qualified long-term servicers. Higher costs and a less stable 
industry outlook will reduce the incentive for servicers to adopt long term investments in the servicing 
business or build mortgage servicing capacity. The GSEs' ability to manage their servicing portfolios would be 
adversely affected by the reduction in the number of servicers capable of absorbing servicing transfers in case 
of servicer failures or involuntary servicer terminations.” 
Arvest Bank Group, Inc. 
“While MSRs are technically classified as intangible assets, they are directly related to profit producing 
contracts with actual value in the marketplace. There is far more similarity of MSRs to other earnings assets, 
such as loans, than to other intangible assets, such as a copyright on a patented process. MSRs generate 
specific cash flows and are subject to ongoing assessment for impairment. To exclude MSRs from capital is 
extraordinarily extreme and assumes there must be dollar-for-dollar capital to support MSRs to provide for a 
catastrophic loss. To treat MSRs as needing 100% capital essentially destroys the private involvement in 
mortgage servicing. While the MSR business is profitable, often times very profitable for skilled operators, 
profits available will not be sufficient to justify a 100% capital requirement” 
Bank of America Corporation 
“The cash flows associated with identifiable intangible assets, such as mortgage servicing rights, core 
deposits and purchased credit card receivables are well understood and predictable, so objective and 
supportable valuations can be established for these assets. The apparent extrapolation of the treatment 
of goodwill to these assets is not risk based as their value can be established without a high degree of 
uncertainty. Experience from the recent market turmoil demonstrates the resilience of mortgage servicing 
rights, for which values were maintained. The Committee's proposed treatment is disproportionate to the 
risk of these assets, which are typically hedged for prepayment risk, and places them in the same risk 
category as residual interests or sub investment grade securitization tranches.  This contradicts the 
economic reality that payments to mortgage servicers are the highest priority claim on interest 
distributions in a securitization structure. Finally, full deduction of mortgage servicing rights would render 
the activity unprofitable for banks and drive it towards unregulated entities wi th less sophisticated risk 
management processes and weaker supervisory oversight.” 
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Appendix C – Comment letter excerpts that oppose MSR treatment, continued 
First Horizon National Corporation 
“As a result of the Capital Proposal, mortgage servicing assets includable in regulatory capital will decrease 
from the current 100% of Tier 1 to 10% of CET1, which would be a significant drop for those banks with large 
retail mortgage operations that retain servicing rights. Such banks would thus in many cases be significantly 
more inclined to sell loans with servicing rights released in light of the more severe limitations in the Capital 
Proposal. In recognition of the fact that this deduction would disproportionately affect banks with sizable retail 
mortgage positions that have been developed in reliance on their ability to retain servicing rights that would be 
fully includable in Tier 1 capital, we suggest that, at a minimum, existing MSAs should be grandfathered.” 
Independent Bank Corporation 
“The NPR would limit our Bank's ability to service mortgage loans for our customers by deducting any 
mortgage servicing rights in excess of 10% of common equity from capital. Furthermore, the punitive risk-
weighting will create a strong incentive for this business to leave the banking industry.  
Our customers enjoy having a local bank service their mortgage. Furthermore, this activity fits well with other 
retail banking strategies. We have found that servicing a customer's mortgage loan provides avenues for 
providing checking accounts and other banking relationships…We ask that the banking regulatory agencies 
significantly moderate the capital allocation for mortgage servicing rights. While mortgage servicing has a 
unique risk profile it is a key customer relationship for community banks.” 
SunTrust Banks, Inc. 
“SunTrust supports the Committee in its position that the capital base should be adjusted for any balance-sheet 
assets whose value(s) would be highly uncertain in times of stress or insolvency. However, SunTrust believes 
that mortgage servicing rights (MSR’s) should not be classified as such an asset. Strong MSR markets exist 
and highly reliable valuation approaches supported by readily available, market-provided inputs are an 
industry standard. Though the pricing inputs themselves may be above or below historical averages during 
times of stress (as was the case recently), pricing would still be possible and, furthermore, would be possible to 
a relatively similar degree of certainty. SunTrust recommends MSR’s not be considered in this adjustment.” 
U.S. Bancorp  
“The Company urges the Agencies to maintain the current risk-based capital treatment for MSAs. The 
proposed rules would increase the overall risk-weight for MSAs from 215% to 350%.  
The Company believes that the current capital rules reflect fairly the valuation risks inherent in a bank's MSA 
portfolio. Mortgage servicing cash flows are contractual and have priority on GNMA and most private label 
residential mortgage-backed securities. FNMA and FHLMC mortgage-backed securities are paid directly to 
the servicers by these GSEs. The principal risks in MSA valuations are prepayment risk and increased 
servicing costs related to defaulted mortgages. These risks are addressed effectively in the increased 
sophistication of hedging programs, valuation models, improvement to model validation and review processes, 
and comprehensive stress testing processes which have advanced materially since the financial crisis.” 
Wells Fargo & Company 
“Wells Fargo is not aware of any MSA-related weaknesses that have been identified as contributing to the 
financial crisis and that would support a determination that such a significant increase in minimum capital 
requirements for MSAs is necessary. Given the increased effect of the proposed rules on the treatment of 
MSAs that will result from application of the BCBS Basel III standards alone, Wells Fargo urges the 
Agencies to determine that 100% of the fair value of MSAs may be recognized for regulatory capital 
purposes.” 
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Figure 1 – Research design using Basel III timeline 
This figure depicts how we split the sample period into various sub-periods. The periods are based on the regulatory timeline detailed as part of Table 1. The sub-periods are 
defined as follows: the Basel period begins after the Basel Committee released the initial consultative document for Basel III (December, 2009) and ends when the details of the 
regulatory standards were agreed upon by the Basel Committee’s oversight body (December, 2010). The FedReserve period then begins and extends through the date that the 
Federal Reserve approved a final rule based on the Basel Committee’s proposed framework (June, 2013). The Adopted period then begins and extends through the final mandatory 
compliance date for FDIC-supervised banks (January 1, 2015). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Proposal Basel FedReserve Adoption
Jan. 2006 Dec. 2009 Dec. 2010 Jun. 2013 Dec. 2014
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Figure 2 – Time series of MSR balances for Treatment and Control banks  
This figure shows the quarterly average of MSR balances of each bank divided by the same bank’s MSR balance at the end of Q4 2009, when the Basel Committee released the 
initial Basel III consultative document.  The graph plots these averages separately for treatment and control banks, with vertical lines dividing the post-announcement period into 
three distinct stages of rulemaking that are utilized in subsequent analyses.  
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Table 1 – Timeline of the regulatory announcements related to Basel III 
 
 
  
Event No. Date Regulatory Agency Event Description
1 December 17, 2009
Bank for
International
Settlements
The Basel Committee issues “Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector ”. This consultative 
document is a package of proposals aimed at promoting a more resilient banking sector. Included therein 
is the proposal that intangible assets (e.g., MSRs) be deducted from the equity component of Tier 1 
capital. Comments invited by April 16, 2010.
2 July 26, 2010
Bank for
International
Settlements
The Basel Committee releases an annex that modifies several of the proposals included in the initial 
consultative document. One of these modifications is that MSRs receive limited recognition, capped at 
10% of the equity component of Tier 1 capital, rather than being fully deducted.
3 December 16, 2010
Bank for
International
Settlements
The Basel Committee details the Basel III regulatory framework. The new framework reiterates the limited 
recognition of MSRs that was previously proposed and increases the risk-weighting of the MSRs 
included in the equity component of Tier 1 capital from 100% to 250%. A timeline is released that calls for 
banks to begin to comply with these rules in 2015.
4 April 3, 2012
Bank for
International
Settlements
The Basel Committee issues a progress report on members’ progress in adopting Basel III. The United 
States is classified as “1 – Draft regulation not published. This status corresponds to cases where no 
draft law, regulation, or other official document has been made public to detail the planned content of the 
domestic regulatory rules. This status includes cases where a jurisdiction has communicated high-level 
information about its implementation plans but not detailed rules.”
5 June 7, 2012
Federal Reserve
Board of Governors
The Board issues three proposals that would implement both the Basel III regulatory capital reforms and 
the changes required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Board 
proposes that the treatment of MSRs, outlined in the Basel III regulatory framework, be adopted. The 
Board proposes that this treatment be in addition to the current rules that only allow 90% of MSRs to be 
included in the common equity component of Tier 1 capital. The Federal Reserve specifically solicits 
comments on the treatment of MSRs in Question 35 of the proposed regulation. The Board invites 
comments by September 7, 2012.
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Table 1 – Timeline of the regulatory announcements related to Basel III, continued 
 
  
Event No. Date Regulatory Agency Event Description
6 October 8, 2012
Bank for
International
Settlements
The Basel Committee issues a progress report on members’ progress in adopting Basel III. The United 
States is now classified as “2 – draft regulation published. This status corresponds to cases where a draft 
law, regulation, or other official document is already publicly available, for example for public 
consultation or legislative deliberations. The content of the document has to be specific enough to be 
implemented when adopted.” 
7 April 12, 2013
Bank for
International
Settlements
The Basel Committee issues a progress report on members’ progress in adopting Basel III. The United 
States is still classified as ‘2 – draft regulation published.’
8 July 2, 2013
Federal Reserve
Board of Governors
The Board approves the final Basel III rule with only minimal changes to the proposed treatment of 
MSRs. Specifically, the previous limitation that only 90% of MSRs be included in the common equity 
component of Tier 1 capital was removed in favor of the Basel Committee’s more stringent requirements. 
Implementation to begin on Jan 1, 2014 (Jan 1, 2015) for Advanced Approaches (non-Advanced 
Approaches) institutions.
9 October 1, 2013
Bank for
International
Settlements
The Basel Committee issues a progress report on members’ progress in adopting Basel III. The United 
States is now classified as “3 – final rule published. This status corresponds to cases where the domestic 
legal or regulatory framework has been finalized and approved but is still not applicable to banks.”
10 April 1, 2014
Bank for
International
Settlements
The Basel Committee issues a progress report on members’ progress in adopting Basel III. The United 
States is now classified as “4 - final rule in force. This status corresponds to cases where the domestic 
legal and regulatory framework is already applied to banks. 
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Table 2 – Sample Selection 
 
Panel A - U.S. commercial bank holding companies (quarterly observations)   
Details No. of Observations 
    
Quarterly observations (Q1 2007 - Q4 2014) of banks that have an MSR 
balance for all quarters (including 2006 lagged values) 
7,360  
Less:  Observations with Unpaid Principal Balance < $1 million (600) 
Less: Observations with missing data in the variables used (1,449) 
Final sample 5,311  
 
Panel B - Public U.S. commercial bank holding companies (annual observations)   
Details No. of Observations 
    
Final sample from Panel A 5,311  
Less:  Observations with no Permco or market price in CRSP.  Permco's were 
used to identify banks that would be required to file Form 10-K with the SEC 
(2,857) 
Less: Observations from 2014, and Quarters 1 - 3 for all years because the 10-Q 
often does not contain a rollforward of the MSR balance 
(1,464) 
Less: Observations that are missing information necessary to roll forward the 
MSR balance 
(510) 
Final sample 480  
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Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Variables N mean p25 p50 p75 sd 
Dependent Variables             
OTD 5,311 11.152 0.429 5.177 14.728 15.935 
UPB 5,311 13.067 11.791 12.597 13.798 2.080 
MSR_UPB (%) 5,311 0.779 0.591 0.774 0.942 0.321 
              
Independent Variables             
Ln_Assets 5,311 14.965 13.683 14.360 15.668 1.783 
Residential (%) 5,311 20.081 14.713 19.779 24.810 7.413 
ROE (%) 5,311 1.403 0.992 1.891 2.699 6.628 
10YrBond (%) 5,311 2.990 2.230 2.730 3.530 0.906 
Unemployment (%) 5,311 7.283 5.700 7.300 8.700 2.210 
RevMix (%) 5,311 21.613 14.706 20.563 26.912 9.631 
RegPressure 5,311 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.295 
MSR_Tier1 (%) 5,311 3.257 0.648 1.738 3.696 4.913 
Letter 166 0.349 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.477 
Oppose 166 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.295 
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Table 3, continued – Correlations 
Panel B: Correlations                 
  Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
1 OTD 1 0.50 0.18 0.26 -0.30 -0.06 -0.15 0.09 0.35 0.47 0.31 0.15 0.19 
2 UPB 0.27 1 0.37 0.65 -0.17 -0.10 -0.08 0.05 0.42 0.63 0.40 0.23 0.43 
3 MSR_UPB (%) 0.07 0.39 1 0.25 -0.17 0.00 0.20 -0.14 0.10 0.53 0.21 0.08 0.19 
4 Ln_Assets 0.03 0.81 0.32 1 -0.11 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.38 0.02 0.19 0.21 0.43 
5 Residential (%) -0.27 -0.12 -0.18 -0.11 1 -0.07 0.09 0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 
6 ROE (%) -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 1 0.01 -0.24 0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.01 -0.05 
7 10YrBond (%) -0.12 -0.06 0.19 -0.04 0.10 0.00 1 -0.22 -0.26 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 Unemployment (%) 0.05 0.02 -0.13 0.00 0.07 -0.06 -0.23 1 0.11 0.03 -0.03 0.09 0.06 
9 RevMix (%) 0.31 0.50 0.12 0.42 -0.09 0.09 -0.24 0.08 1 0.25 0.26 0.20 0.37 
10 MSR_Tier1 (%) 0.41 0.53 0.37 0.22 -0.04 -0.11 0.10 0.01 0.30 1 0.46 0.20 0.32 
11 RegPressure 0.35 0.50 0.21 0.31 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.35 0.64 1 0.15 0.52 
12 Letter 0.07 0.31 0.08 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.18 0.15 1 0.45 
13 Oppose 0.12 0.64 0.20 0.58 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.44 0.44 0.52 0.45 1 
Pearson pairwise correlations are in the lower left and Spearman correlations are in the upper right         
Correlations that are statistically significant at the 10% level or lower are in bold             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 48 
 
Table 3, continued – Descriptive Statistics of Treatment vs. Control banks 
Panel C:  Treatment vs. Control Banks, comparison of means as of Q4 2009         
  Levels - Q4 2009 
  
Treatment 
(RegPressure)  
Banks - Q4 2009 
  Control Banks 
  
=Diff in Mean 
(Treat-Cont)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Variables N mean sd   N mean sd   Diff t-stat 
Dependent Variables                     
OTD 16 32.467 28.651   150 10.353 15.463   22.114 4.92 
UPB 16 16.436 2.672   150 12.713 1.658   3.723 7.97 
MSR_UPB (%) 16 1.050 0.236   150 0.757 0.296   0.292 3.82 
                      
Independent Variables                     
Ln_Assets 16 16.698 2.900   150 14.765 1.532   1.934 4.32 
Residential (%) 16 19.945 7.706   150 20.424 7.253   -0.479 0.25 
ROE (%) 16 -4.889 12.903   150 0.194 4.336   -5.082 -3.40 
10YrBond (%) 16 3.850 0.000   150 3.850 0.000   0.000 0.00 
Unemployment (%) 16 8.863 3.057   150 9.395 1.915   -0.533 -0.99 
RevMix (%) 16 32.481 13.232   150 20.097 9.290   12.383 4.85 
RegPressure 16 1.000 0.000   150 0.000 0.000   1.000 - 
MSR_Tier1 (%) 16 16.987 5.659   150 2.312 2.213   14.675 20.54 
Letter 16 0.563 0.512   150 0.327 0.471   0.236 1.89 
Oppose 16 0.563 0.512   150 0.047 0.212   0.516 7.71 
 
Panel D:  Treatment vs. Control Banks, comparison of pre-announcement changes        
  Average quarterly change (trend) - 2007-2009 
  
Treatment 
(RegPressure)  
Banks - Q4 2009 
  Control Banks  
  
=Diff in Mean 
(Treat-Cont)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Variables N mean sd   N mean sd   Diff t-stat 
Dependent Variables                     
OTD 192 0.140 0.703   1,799 0.211 0.924   -0.071 -1.03 
UPB 192 0.002 0.004   1,799 0.002 0.006   0.000 -0.03 
MSR_UPB (%) 192 0.004 0.164   1,799 0.000 0.154   0.004 0.30 
                      
Independent Variables                     
Ln_Assets 192 0.001 0.003   1,799 0.001 0.002   0.000 -1.49 
Residential (%) 192 -0.002 0.056   1,799 -0.004 0.042   0.002 0.53 
ROE (%) 192 -0.517 2.773   1,799 -0.333 2.147   -0.184 -1.09 
10YrBond (%) 192 0.002 0.186   1,799 0.002 0.186   0.000 0.00 
Unemployment (%) 192 0.069 0.114   1,799 0.071 0.121   -0.002 -0.20 
RevMix (%) 192 0.030 0.320   1,799 0.030 0.238   0.000 0.00 
RegPressure 192 0.000 0.000   1,799 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.00 
MSR_Tier1 (%) 192 0.038 0.224   1,799 0.022 0.210   0.017 1.03 
Letter 192 0.000 0.000   1,799 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.00 
Oppose 192 0.000 0.000   1,799 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.00 
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Table 4 – Lobbying  
Below are presented the results from OLS regression of Letter and Oppose on RegPressure and controls.  Letter is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the bank submitted a letter to rule makers, zero otherwise  Oppose is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if the bank submitted a letter to rule makers that opposed the proposed treatment of MSRs, zero 
otherwise.  RegPressure is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank’s ratio of MSRs to its estimated Basel III Tier 1 capital is 
greater than 10% as of December 31, 2009, and zero otherwise. 
 
  Dependent Variable 
  
Letter 
  
Oppose 
Oppose 
    (Letter=1) 
Variables (1) Pred (2) (3) 
          
RegPressure 0.0568 + 0.3241*** 0.2836* 
  (0.601)   (0.001) (0.091) 
Residentialt-1  0.0008   0.0045* 0.0032 
  (0.866)   (0.067) (0.628) 
ROE -0.0057   -0.0030 -0.0142*** 
  (0.296)   (0.418) (0.003) 
Unemployment 0.0396**   0.0183** -0.0116 
  (0.011)   (0.014) (0.542) 
RevMix 0.0048   0.0041 0.0138** 
  (0.228)   (0.156) (0.050) 
Ln_Assetst-1 0.0573***   0.0702*** 0.0730** 
  (0.009)   (0.000) (0.040) 
          
Observations 166   166 58 
R-squared 0.117   0.505 0.665 
Robust standard errors; p-values in parentheses 
***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. Where we have a 
predicted sign for the coefficient, significance levels are one-tailed. 
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Table 5 – Timing of changes in operational behavior and valuation 
Below are presented the results from OLS regression of OTD, UPB, and MSR_UPB on RegPressure and controls (with the Basel 
III post-announcement period split into three periods – Basel, FedReserve, and Adopted). OTD is the ratio of loans originated for 
resale during the quarter scaled by the beginning of the quarter mortgage loans on the balance sheet. UPB is the natural log of 
total quarter-end unpaid principle balance (UPB) on loans serviced for others. MSR_UPB is the MSR balance divided by unpaid 
principal balance (UPB). RegPressure is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank’s ratio of MSRs to its estimated Basel III 
Tier 1 capital is greater than 10% as of December 31, 2009, and zero otherwise. The models omit the RegPressure main effect as 
an independent variable since it remains constant across all quarters for a given bank. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
A. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 
    Dependent Variable 
  
Pred 
OTD UPB MSR_UPB 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
          
Basel*RegPressure - -3.4700* -0.1203* -0.1124** 
    (0.098) (0.097) (0.018) 
FedReserve*RegPressure - -7.1519** -0.2835** -0.1755*** 
    (0.015) (0.019) (0.002) 
Adoption*RegPressure - -11.5202*** -0.6228** -0.1050* 
    (0.001) (0.025) (0.073) 
Basel   -2.6960*** 0.0727*** 0.0099 
    (0.000) (0.003) (0.445) 
FedReserve   -5.6868*** 0.0867* 0.0228 
    (0.000) (0.059) (0.181) 
Adoption   -12.9292*** 0.0613 0.0680*** 
    (0.000) (0.351) (0.004) 
Residentialt-1   0.0817 -0.0047 -0.0092*** 
    (0.530) (0.661) (0.007) 
ROE   -0.0688*** -0.0007 -0.0001 
    (0.000) (0.278) (0.808) 
10yrBond   -1.0720*** 0.0222*** 0.0883*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trend   0.3828*** 0.0112** 0.0012 
    (0.000) (0.011) (0.444) 
Unemployment   0.2971 0.0163*** -0.0137*** 
    (0.103) (0.004) (0.000) 
RevMix   0.3770*** 0.0051* 0.0006 
    (0.000) (0.077) (0.599) 
Ln_Assetst-1   0.7030     
    (0.735)     
Ln_Assets     0.3714** 0.0450 
      (0.041) (0.395) 
          
Bank Fixed Effects   Included Included Included 
Observations   5,311 5,311 5,311 
R-squared   0.739 0.967 0.761 
Standard errors clustered by firm; p-values in parentheses 
***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. Where we have a 
predicted sign for the coefficient, significance levels are one-tailed. 
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Table 6 – The influence of market discipline on banks’ response to Basel III 
Below are presented the results from OLS regression of OTD, UPB, and MSR_UPB on RegPressure and controls (with the Basel 
III post-announcement period split into three periods – Basel, FedReserve, and Adopted).  OTD is the ratio of loans originated for 
resale during the quarter scaled by the beginning of the quarter mortgage loans on the balance sheet. UPB is the natural log of 
total quarter-end unpaid principle balance (UPB) on loans serviced for others. MSR_UPB is the MSR balance divided by unpaid 
principal balance (UPB). RegPressure is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank’s ratio of MSRs to its estimated Basel III 
Tier 1 capital is greater than 10% as of December 31, 2009, and zero otherwise. The models omit the RegPressure main effect as 
an independent variable since it remains constant across all quarters for a given bank. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
A. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 
    Dependent Variable 
  
Pred 
OTD OTD UPB UPB MSR_UPB MSR_UPB 
  Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Variable (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
                
Basel*RegPressure - -7.7519** 2.4792 -0.2360* -0.0398 -0.1245*** -0.0793 
    (0.014) (0.804) (0.053) (0.397) (0.005) (0.224) 
FedReserve*RegPressure - -9.6025** -3.9668 -0.4715** -0.0984 -0.2132*** -0.1158 
 
  (0.006) (0.234) (0.012) (0.239) (0.000) (0.117) 
Adoption*RegPressure - -13.4454*** -8.9055* -1.0503** -0.1344 -0.1906** 0.0068 
    (0.000) (0.097) (0.024) (0.176) (0.015) (0.526) 
Basel   -1.2571 -3.9105*** 0.1406*** 0.0195 0.0079 0.0103 
    (0.108) (0.000) (0.003) (0.413) (0.722) (0.514) 
FedReserve   -4.4853*** -6.5204*** 0.1860** -0.0015 0.0339 0.0142 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.968) (0.145) (0.565) 
Adoption   -12.8701*** -12.5832*** 0.1811 -0.0378 0.0953*** 0.0488 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.151) (0.479) (0.003) (0.142) 
ResidentialL.   0.2114 0.0048 0.0080 -0.0150* -0.0088 -0.0087* 
    (0.410) (0.971) (0.748) (0.052) (0.117) (0.052) 
ROE   -0.0584 -0.0811*** -0.0021 0.0002 0.0004 -0.0003 
    (0.142) (0.000) (0.254) (0.674) (0.583) (0.262) 
10yrBond   -0.5428* -1.5716*** 0.0151 0.0243*** 0.1190*** 0.0632*** 
    (0.059) (0.000) (0.127) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trend   0.4340*** 0.3145*** 0.0109 0.0115*** 0.0035* -0.0008 
    (0.001) (0.000) (0.224) (0.003) (0.068) (0.721) 
Unemployment   -0.3462 0.8962*** 0.0142* 0.0188*** -0.0141*** -0.0128*** 
    (0.111) (0.002) (0.100) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) 
RevMix   0.3192*** 0.4378*** 0.0097* 0.0020 -0.0012 0.0023 
    (0.001) (0.000) (0.082) (0.389) (0.436) (0.158) 
Ln_AssetsL.   1.6495 0.1625         
    (0.616) (0.942)         
Ln_Assets       0.3664 0.3175* -0.0259 0.1287 
        (0.249) (0.057) (0.673) (0.130) 
                
Bank Fixed Effects   Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations   2,454 2,857 2,454 2,857 2,454 2,857 
R-squared   0.692 0.773 0.966 0.967 0.759 0.767 
Standard errors clustered by firm; p-values in parentheses 
***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. Where we have a predicted sign for 
the coefficient, significance levels are one-tailed. 
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Table 7 – The influence of uncertainty on banks’ response to Basel III 
Below are presented the results from OLS regression of OTD, UPB, and MSR_UPB on RegPressure and controls (with the Basel 
III post-announcement period split into three periods – Basel, FedReserve, and Adopted).  OTD is the ratio of loans originated for 
resale during the quarter scaled by the beginning of the quarter mortgage loans on the balance sheet. UPB is the natural log of 
total quarter-end unpaid principle balance (UPB) on loans serviced for others. MSR_UPB is the MSR balance divided by unpaid 
principal balance (UPB). RegPressure is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank’s ratio of MSR’s to estimated Basel III Tier 1 
capital is greater than 10% as of December 31, 2009, and zero otherwise. The models omit the RegPressure main effect as an 
independent variable since it remains constant across all quarters for a given bank. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 
    Dependent Variables 
  
Pred 
OTD OTD UPB UPB MSR_UPB MSR_UPB 
  >$10Bln <$10Bln >$10Bln <$10Bln >$10Bln <$10Bln 
Variable (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
                
Basel*RegPressure - -8.7312** 0.9510 -0.2625 -0.0551 -0.1310** -0.0673 
    (0.030) (0.651) (0.141) (0.281) (0.018) (0.209) 
FedReserve*RegPressure - -8.4802*** -5.3444 -0.4757** -0.1213 -0.1755*** -0.0956 
    (0.035) (0.119) (0.046) (0.169) (0.008) (0.118) 
Adoption*RegPressure - -12.3593*** -10.3978** -1.0168* -0.1864* -0.1719* -0.0118 
    (0.001) (0.035) (0.076) (0.078) (0.074) (0.447) 
Basel   -0.3449 -3.2369*** 0.1285 0.0600*** 0.0125 0.0083 
    (0.844) (0.000) (0.291) (0.000) (0.662) (0.560) 
FedReserve   -2.5188 -6.3799*** 0.1562 0.0587* 0.0299 0.0167 
    (0.305) (0.000) (0.445) (0.058) (0.478) (0.358) 
Adoption   -8.9195** -13.3454*** 0.1651 0.0359 0.1088* 0.0581** 
    (0.014) (0.000) (0.556) (0.474) (0.073) (0.022) 
Residentialt-1   0.7092 -0.0247 0.0873** -0.0190** 0.0013 -0.0103*** 
    (0.167) (0.846) (0.011) (0.045) (0.926) (0.002) 
ROE   -0.0054 -0.0796*** -0.0044 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0002 
    (0.913) (0.000) (0.583) (0.317) (0.595) (0.352) 
10yrBond   0.1473 -1.3019*** -0.0083 0.0288*** 0.1886*** 0.0682*** 
    (0.747) (0.000) (0.560) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trend   0.3395* 0.3693*** 0.0156 0.0104** 0.0080** -0.0007 
    (0.089) (0.000) (0.295) (0.014) (0.019) (0.693) 
Unemployment   -0.2553 0.4733** 0.0239 0.0156*** -0.0110* -0.0146*** 
    (0.550) (0.014) (0.311) (0.002) (0.095) (0.000) 
RevMix   0.1187 0.4802*** -0.0015 0.0080** -0.0022 0.0017 
    (0.143) (0.000) (0.730) (0.026) (0.133) (0.248) 
Ln_Assetst-1   5.7265 -0.4207         
    (0.266) (0.818)         
Ln_Assets       0.4385 0.3851* -0.0734 0.1226** 
        (0.273) (0.056) (0.352) (0.034) 
                
Bank Fixed Effects   Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations   928 4,383 928 4,383 928 4,383 
R-squared   0.650 0.759 0.952 0.933 0.675 0.771 
Standard errors clustered by firm; p-values in parentheses 
***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. Where we have a predicted sign for the 
coefficient, significance levels are one-tailed. 
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Table 8 – Changes in MSR valuations: an analysis of amortization and capitalization rates 
Below are the descriptive statistics (Panel A) and the results from OLS regression of MSR_UPB, AmortRate, and CapRate on 
RegPressure and control variables (Panel B).  MSR_UPB is MSR balance divided by unpaid principal balance (UPB). AmortRate 
is the amortization (or fair value adjustment) of MSR for the quarter divided by beginning MSR balance plus newly originated 
MSRs and MSR purchases for the year. CapRate is the number of dollars of unpaid principal balance (UPB) per dollar of MSR 
for additions to the MSR balance for the quarter. Post is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the annual filing falls 
in the Basel, FedReserve, or Adopted time periods, zero otherwise. RegPressure is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank’s 
ratio of MSRs to its estimated Basel III Tier 1 capital is greater than 10% as of December 31, 2009, and zero otherwise. The 
models omit the RegPressure main effect as an independent variable since it remains constant across all quarters for a given bank. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics           
Variable N mean p25 p50 p75 sd 
MSR_UPB 480 0.789 0.615 0.752 0.941 0.298 
AmortRate (%) 480 21.346 14.997 21.086 28.790 12.204 
CapRate 426 4.913 4.583 4.895 5.259 0.811 
Ln_Assets 480 15.878 14.515 15.292 16.680 2.077 
Residential (%) 480 20.801 16.270 20.371 25.351 7.167 
ROE (%) 480 0.624 1.066 1.895 2.678 6.743 
10YrBond (%) 480 3.108 2.070 3.170 3.945 1.002 
Unemployment (%) 480 7.079 5.400 7.300 8.650 2.392 
RevMix (%) 480 23.307 15.927 22.551 29.239 9.206 
UPB 480 14.192 12.439 13.248 15.414 2.541 
RegPressure 480 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.357 
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Table 8, continued – Changes in MSR valuations 
 
Panel B:  Valuation Mechanisms Regression Analysis  
    Dependent Variable 
    MSR_UPB   AmortRate CapRate 
Variable Pred (1) Pred (2) (3) 
            
Post*RegPressure - -0.1543*** + 4.2586** 0.2268** 
    (0.008)   (0.019) (0.035) 
Post   0.0492**   5.5965*** 0.1274 
    (0.025)   (0.001) (0.263) 
Residentialt-1   -0.0063   0.0287 .0215* 
    (0.118)   (0.873) (0.082) 
ROE   0.0004   0.0824 0.0021 
    (0.609)   (0.201) (0.557) 
10yrBond   0.1050***   -8.6792*** -0.3909*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Trend   0.0031   -4.1027*** -0.1973*** 
    (0.731)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment   -0.0038   1.1680*** -0.0227 
    (0.493)   (0.000) (0.260) 
RevMix   0.0020   -0.1580 -0.0043 
    (0.501)   (0.425) (0.600) 
Ln_Assetst-1   -0.0206     0.5961** 
    (0.822)     (0.026) 
Ln_Assets       0.5328   
        (0.873)   
UPB         0.1841 
          (0.108) 
            
Bank Fixed Effects   Included   Included Included 
Observations   480   480 426 
R-squared   0.802   0.442 0.696 
Standard errors clustered by firm; p-values in parentheses     
***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. Where we have a 
predicted sign for the coefficient, significance levels are one-tailed. 
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Table 9 – Performance analysis 
 
Below are presented the results from OLS regression of LLP, ROA, and ROE on RegPressure and controls. LLP is defined as the 
loan loss provision for the quarter, scaled by lagged total loans. ROA is net income divided by total assets. ROE is net income 
divided by total equity. RegPressure is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank’s ratio of MSRs to its estimated Basel III Tier 
1 capital is greater than 10% as of December 31, 2009, and zero otherwise. The models omit the RegPressure main effect as an 
independent variable since it remains constant across all quarters for a given bank. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 
  Dependent Variable 
    LLP   ROA ROE 
Variable Pred (1) Pred (2a) (2b) 
            
Basel*RegPressure - -0.0431* +/- -0.0004 -1.4558 
    (0.052)   (0.263) (0.352) 
FedReserve*RegPressure - -0.0834*** +/-  0.0008 0.6831 
    (0.004)   (0.302) (0.487) 
Adoption*RegPressure - -0.1026*** +/-  0.0002 -0.0029 
    (0.000)   (0.689) (0.997) 
Basel   -0.0198**   0.0015*** 1.5813*** 
    (0.037)   (0.000) (0.000) 
FedReserve   -0.0525***   0.0026*** 3.5775*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Adoption   -0.0936***   0.0028*** 4.2914*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
LLP t-1   0.5228***       
    (0.000)       
NPL t+1   0.0157***       
    (0.006)       
NPL   0.0362***       
    (0.000)       
NPL t-1   0.0234***       
    (0.001)       
NPL t-2   0.0209***       
    (0.000)       
ΔLOANS   -0.0060***       
    (0.000)       
ΔGDP   -0.0308       
    (0.759)       
CaseShiller   -0.2673**       
    (0.015)       
ΔUnemployment   -0.0106**       
    (0.021)       
Ln_Assets t-1   0.1210***   -0.0013** -1.9268*** 
    (0.000)   (0.011) (0.005) 
10YrBond       0.0005*** 0.4941*** 
        (0.000) (0.008) 
Trend       -0.0001*** -0.1711** 
        (0.001) (0.020) 
Unemployment       -0.0002*** -0.2434*** 
        (0.000) (0.010) 
RevMix       0.0001*** 0.2382** 
        (0.000) (0.021) 
            
Bank Fixed Effects   Included   Included Included 
Observations   5,092   5,092 5,092 
R-squared   0.592   0.241 0.126 
Standard errors clustered by firm; p-values in parentheses     
***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. Where we have a predicted sign for 
the coefficient, significance levels are one-tailed. 
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Table 10 – Robustness test examining trends prior to the announcement of Basel III 
Below are presented the results from OLS regression of OTD, UPB, and MSR_UPB on RegPressure and controls for 2008-2009 
(the two years leading up to the release of the initial Basel III consultative document).  Crisis is an indicator equal to 1 for the 
year 2009 and zero for the year 2008.  This test is intended to identify the presence of non-parallel trends in the relations of 
interest between treatment and control banks in the time period preceding the initial Basel III announcement.  OTD is the ratio of 
loans originated for resale during the quarter scaled by the beginning of the quarter mortgage loans on the balance sheet. UPB is 
the natural log of total quarter-end unpaid principle balance (UPB) on loans serviced for others. MSR_UPB is the MSR balance 
divided by unpaid principal balance (UPB).  RegPressure is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank’s ratio of MSRs to its 
estimated Basel III Tier 1 capital is greater than 10% as of December 31, 2009, and zero otherwise.  The models omit the 
RegPressure main effect as an independent variable since it remains constant across all quarters for a given bank. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 
    Dependent Variable 
  
Pred 
OTD UPB MSR_UPB 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
          
Crisis*RegPressure +/- 5.0970 -0.0874 -0.0594 
    (0.407) (0.280) (0.369) 
Crisis   11.5562*** 0.0988** -0.0194 
    (0.000) (0.027) (0.438) 
Residentialt-1   0.3836 -0.0192* -0.0046 
    (0.315) (0.083) (0.489) 
ROE   -0.0665 -0.0005 0.0003 
    (0.102) (0.472) (0.712) 
10yrBond   -0.1269 0.0090 0.0881*** 
    (0.758) (0.381) (0.000) 
Trend   -2.0906*** 0.0352*** 0.0022 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.663) 
Unemployment   1.2807** -0.0260 -0.0134 
    (0.022) (0.186) (0.152) 
RevMix   0.4125*** 0.0016 0.0032** 
    (0.009) (0.302) (0.014) 
Ln_Assetst-1   -3.3637     
    (0.742)     
Ln_Assets     0.1410 -0.1098 
      (0.359) (0.149) 
          
Bank Fixed Effects   Included Included Included 
Observations   1,328 1,328 1,328 
R-squared   0.759 0.993 0.868 
Standard errors clustered by firm; p-values in parentheses   
***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. Where we have a 
predicted sign for the coefficient, significance levels are one-tailed. 
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Table 11 – Robustness test using continuous version of RegPressure variable 
Below are presented the results from OLS regression of OTD, UPB, and MSR_UPB on MSR_Tier1 and controls (with the Basel 
III post-announcement period split into three periods – Basel, FedReserve, and Adopted). OTD is the ratio of loans originated for 
resale during the quarter scaled by the beginning of the quarter mortgage loans on the balance sheet. UPB is the natural log of 
total quarter-end unpaid principle balance (UPB) on loans serviced for others. MSR_UPB is the MSR balance divided by unpaid 
principal balance (UPB). MSR_Tier1 is the bank’s ratio of MSR’s to estimated Basel III Tier 1 capital as of December 31, 2009 
(see additional details in Appendix A).  The models omit the MSR_Tier1 main effect as an independent variable since it remains 
constant across all quarters for a given bank. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered by firm. 
 
    Dependent Variable 
  
Pred 
OTD UPB MSR_UPB 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
          
Basel*MSR_Tier1 - -0.2761** -0.0084* -0.0061** 
    (0.014) (0.062) (0.013) 
FedReserve*MSR_Tier1 - -0.3408** -0.0163** -0.0145*** 
    (0.017) (0.022) (0.000) 
Adoption*MSR_Tier1 - -0.8018*** -0.0349** -0.0093** 
    (0.000) (0.010) (0.011) 
Basel   -2.0543*** 0.0916** 0.0228 
    (0.007) (0.016) (0.128) 
FedReserve   -0.4659 0.0960 0.0437* 
    (0.652) (0.141) (0.074) 
Adoption   -4.6438*** 0.1029 0.0718*** 
    (0.000) (0.231) (0.007) 
Residentialt-1   0.1195 -0.0034 -0.0084** 
    (0.354) (0.755) (0.013) 
ROE   -0.0813*** -0.0005 0.0001 
    (0.000) (0.390) (0.789) 
10yrBond   -0.9109*** 0.0183** 0.0867*** 
    (0.001) (0.029) (0.000) 
Trend   0.1113* 0.0122*** 0.0020 
    (0.079) (0.004) (0.165) 
Unemployment   0.6342*** 0.0137** -0.0154*** 
    (0.001) (0.022) (0.000) 
RevMix   0.4012*** 0.0057* 0.0010 
    (0.000) (0.054) (0.368) 
Ln_Assetst-1   0.9468     
    (0.651)     
Ln_Assets     0.3727** 0.0434 
      (0.043) (0.398) 
          
Bank Fixed Effects   Included Included Included 
Observations   5,311 5,311 5,311 
R-squared   0.741 0.967 0.764 
Standard errors clustered by firm; p-values in parentheses 
***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. Where we have a 
predicted sign for the coefficient, significance levels are one-tailed. 
 
